Le Monde Interview: Putin Doesn’t Care About Sanctions

June 10, 2014

Mikhail Khodorkovsky recently gave an interview to the French newspaper Le Monde to discuss the developing situation in Ukraine. The following is a translation from the French edition (the Russian text can be read here).

Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Putin doesn’t care about sanctions

Le Monde, 06.06.2014

Released in December of last year, after ten years of imprisonment, Mikhail Khodorkovsky is the former head of the Yukos oil group and an opposition figure who became a refugee in Switzerland, and who is now slowly building a base for his future social life. Moreover, the hot topic of Ukraine has mobilized him during the past few weeks. He traveled twice to Ukraine. In early March, Khodorkovsky spoke before the public in Kiev supporting the Maidan revolution. After that he went to Donetsk (Donbas) for a meeting with the separatists. In a telephone conversation with Le Monde, he shared his vision of Russia’s strategy and its consequences.

– What is your reaction when you hear that Vladimir Putin blames the West for the crisis in Ukraine?

– He repeats the theory that the West did not coordinate with him on Ukraine’s accession to NATO. These arguments are a consequence of the assumption that Ukraine is a part of Russia, and not a sovereign state. The “metropolis” reacts harshly when a “region”, even if autonomous, tries to build relationships with foreign countries. However, from a legal point of view, Russia recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine. But in reality, the revolution that took place there threatens the stability of the Putin’s regime. It is a very powerful example. If a Ukrainian democratic revolution against corruption and a person wishing to become a dictator (former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych) succeeds, then this is a bad argument for Moscow. But if the same country mires in civil war, it will be a good argument.

– What are the costs and benefits of the Ukrainian conflict for Putin?

– It is obvious that Putin has received a great rating in the country and among ultra-right parties in Europe. Today he is losing his reputation not only among Western society but also the establishment. He is in the nationalist rut, from which there is no good way out. He put himself at the mercy of the power entourage. In the long term, Russia is losing out on its technological development in cooperation with the West.

– It is difficult to understand the long-term plan of the Kremlin: is it a constant destabilization of the East?

– This destabilization is beneficial to Putin in regards to geopolitical and domestic considerations. He convinced himself using his own propaganda that fascists and ‘Banderovtsy’ came to power in Kiev. He does not want to capture Donbass due to several reasons, but the people in his immediate circles and the logic of events push him in this direction. These people are actively involved in provoking clashes using Yanukovych’s money. I know, for sure, how fighters are recruited from among Ukrainian citizens using Russian colleagues back from the army.

What surprises me the most is that there is no distinction of the 100% true parallel to the Caucasus in the 1990s and 2000s (beginning of the second war in Chechnya). We also talked about the separatist movements and “anti-terrorist operations.” At that time Russia was “for” (the operation) and now it is “against” it in Ukraine. The West is the contrary.

– What do you think about the principle and the effectiveness of sanctions against Putin’s entourage?

– As a man, I cannot approve sanctions against my country – Russia. In this case, it could be only a moral choice. The country may decide to invite certain individuals to do business with and, vice versa, to go against the others, not to invite them, just as I would not have invited me. But Putin does not care about sanctions. He does not care about his circles. You already live long in a democratic society, where circles (people) are involved in decision-making. In a totalitarian society, a dictator is indifferent to interests of his surroundings, especially of people, who are not a part of power structure. The risks represent another question. Russia is a country of palace coups. But I do not think anyone around Putin, especially at the present time, is able to think in those terms.

– Should France deliver the “Mistral” [warship] to Russia?

– It all depends on how the French perceive these vessels. If we are talking about armed warships capable of creating a threat, let’s say, on the coasts of Georgia and Ukraine, it is one thing. If we are talking about selling junk to stupid barbarians, it is quite another.

– Could you explain your two trips to Ukraine in more detail.

– I needed my first trip to develop my own opinion and to explain Ukrainians that not all people in Russia approve Putin. After this, I organized, as promised, a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia, and I assisted with creating presence of a delegation of Russian observers at the presidential elections. They came at their own expenses; I spent a very little money. I went to Donetsk to meet with separatists in the administration building, which they had seized. The idea of ​​an independent “Republic of Donetsk” is frankly a lie. We are talking about a belt of instability along the eastern border of Ukraine existing due to Russian money. No other economic ideas. There are many ordinary people among the separatists with ordinary socialist ideas and dreams of the USSR or other more equitable, in their view, versions of society. They are ready to listen and hear, but nobody works with them or works scarcely.

– To date, the problem lies in the importance of the armed groups in the Donbas …

– Nobody has complete control over these groups, including Putin’s circle, which to this day has been dealing with these issues. There are several groups, the names and previous activities of people, who manage them, are known. If Russia decided to apply its strict law about sending illegal weapons to the rebels, all this would have ended very quickly. I’m sure Poroshenko should build a dialogue with Putin, at least in order to clarify the position of the latter. At the same time it is evident that a simple conversation will not solve the crisis.

– By the way, do you believe in the revival of separatist movements in the North Caucasus?

– These movements have gone far enough. Russian law does not actually operate there. Russians are regarded as foreigners. Putin does not intervene there; he only buys personal loyalty by providing huge subsidies and providing a ‘roof’ to the ethnic gangs hiding under the guise of security services of the Caucasian republics.

– It seems that the Russian liberal opposition is the first victim of strengthening nationalist mood of the Kremlin and society …

– The Russian liberal opposition, despite its weak organizational capacity, always gathered 10-15% of the population from an intellectual standpoint. Today it is about 10%. Liberal views are not very popular. They are more impressed by the creative class, which is crucial in any modern economy. But in an economy based on oil and gas, they do not count. In history there are no examples where this nationalist hysteria is permanent. I hope that when it is necessary to pay for, then people will wake up. If not, and this is possible with complete impunity, the situation could go so deep that without bloodshed in Europe it will not be resolved.

– What are you going to do in the coming months?

– I’m going to devote myself to social activities, in particular, to my “Open Russia” movement. I will be able to tell you more about it in September. At the moment, I have no opportunity to go to Russia and be free there. I will analyze where I can be most effective, even if life abroad imposes other restrictions.