The following is a translation of an opinion article published in the German newspaper Die Welt am Sonntag by Pavel Khodorkovsky.

Pavel Khodorkovsky, son of the most famous Russian political prisoner, criticizes the reckless German pragmatism in view of Putin’s brutal course of repression against civil society

When Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Vladimir Putin jointly open the Hanover Trade Fair, whose partner country this year is Russia, the world’s largest industrial and technology show should actually be able to offer a stage for celebrating German-Russian relations. The latest harassment of non-governmental organisations in Russia, including German political foundations, has thoroughly spoiled the mood between the two countries. As a son of a political prisoner who has been jailed for almost a decade in Russia, because Putin views his vision of a liberal, modern and open Russia as a threat to his own power base, I nonetheless see an opportunity in these developments. The Putin regime could contribute, through its searches of NGO,s to ending the contradictory German policy towards Russia, finally creating a unified front in order to openly name the ills in Russia and thus bring about positive changes.

For years no other foreign affairs topic has been so controversial in Germany as the question of whether or not Russia may be criticised and if so, how. When in November last year the German Bundestag adopted a resolution that critically but constructively described the developments in Putin’s Russia, there was an immediate outcry from so-called political realists. These advocates of a pragmatic foreign policy guided by German business interests warned that Germany pointing a moralising finger would be completely inappropriate and it would have to be accepted that Russia after all is pursuing its own path of democratisation. SPD Chancellor candidate Peer Steinbrück sent an equally fatal signal when he recently maintained in an interview that western standards of democracy could not be applied in Russia. Former chancellor and Putin specialist Gerhard Schröder was most certainly proud of his fellow party member.

It is precisely this reckless pragmatism that confirms the Russian state leadership in its course of repression and weakens the efforts of Russian civil society in its democratisation of Russia. Ever since Putin returned to the Kremlin a good year ago, he has had government critics relentlessly pursued. Prominent representatives of the opposition’s coordination council like Alexey Navalny are to be silenced through legal proceedings, the Duma delegate Dmitri Gudkov was accused of high treason after he had criticised the Putin regime during a panel discussion in the US. Almost unnoticed by the western public, a group of fourteen young Russians who protested Putin’s inauguration on 6 May 2012 along with ten thousand other Russians have been held in detention pending trial for months due to their participation in “mass unrest” and resistance to state authority. Last November, one of them was sentenced to 4.5 years in penal colony, while eight more were placed under travel restrictions in 2013 and could face similar charges.

The concerted searches of hundreds of NGOs in Russia, including international organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, but also renowned Russian NGOs like Memorial, is the most recent attempt by the Russian authorities to intimidate and silence civil society players.

Given that German foundations were also harassed by the Russian authorities, hopefully the last appeasers of Putin in Germany will have seen that a policy of pussyfooting does not lead to positive change in Russia. Instead, the ills in Russia have to be unequivocally and forcefully addressed, and this with one voice.

Critical words must not be allowed to decay into reprimand with no repercussions. If the Russian leadership does not have to fear any genuine consequences, it will also not permit any changes. Before this backdrop, the decision of the German government to enable Russian civil servants visa-free entry into the EU is questionable. Up to now, the Russian government has only expressed its “thanks” for this proposed easement that should foster cooperation between democratic nations in the form of patronising and intimidating the NGOs. And corrupt officials who wash their illegal money in Europe are rewarded by this. Instead, the EU and the German government should consider linking the approval of the visa easement procedure to legislation that would deny entry into the EU to these props of the repressive Putin regime, who are proven participants in human rights violations and corruption. Similar to the linked repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and the passage of the Magnitsky act in the US Congress, such a measure would in fact have a deterrent effect and would be an effective contribution to strengthening civil society in Russia and promoting the rule of law, while fostering cooperation.

Such a values-based foreign affairs policy is not naive altruism, but rather would also serve Germany’s interests. German-Russian business transactions will only continue to flourish if German companies have legal certainty, so that investments in Russia do not become an incalculable risk. The German economy will also benefit from a prospering Russian middle class with which it can trade.

Personally, it is my hope that German policymakers – with a united voice and clear words – will do what they can for the release of my father. After a verdict in December of last year, he could be released in October 2014. Although I reject this judgment as part of the politically motivated proceedings against my father, nonetheless I hope that it will be implemented and next year – all the better even earlier – we will be able to embrace each other again. Here, it is important that Western governments already make it clear that they expect the reduced sentence to actually be implemented. The actual release of my father could also make a contribution to again reducing the tensions of German-Russian relations.

The author, 27, lives with his wife and their daughter in New York and is President of the Institute of Modern Russia.